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The paper intends to give an insight into the relations of the economic and political systems of 
the Central Asian republics using the theoretical framework of the “rentier economy” and 
“rentier state” approach. The main findings of the paper are that two (Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan) of the five states examined are commodity export dependent “full-scale” rentier 
states. The two political systems are of a stable neo-patrimonial regime character, while the 
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, poor in natural resources but dependent on external rents, 
may be described as “semi-rentier” states or “rentier economies”. They are politically more 
instable, but have an altogether authoritarian, oligarchical “clan-based” character. 
Uzbekistan with its closed economy, showing tendencies of economic autarchy, is also a 
potentially politically unstable clan-based regime. Thus, in the Central Asian context, the 
rentier state or rentier economy character affects the political stability of the actual regimes 
rather than having a direct impact on whether power is exercised in an autocratic or 
democratic way.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past decades, theories concerning rentier economies and rentier states have received 
increasing attention in political science and political economy. The theoretical framework 
constructed on the basis of the oil monarchies of the Gulf States has greatly contributed to 
explaining why the neo-patrimonial way of exercising power has survived to this modern day. 
It is no surprise that theories about rentier economies have been applied to regions of the 
world outside the Middle East, with the post-Soviet Central Asian republics among them. This 
paper gives a critical analysis, attempting to answer the following questions: 
 To what extent is it acceptable to qualify the five post-Soviet Central Asian republics 
as “rentier states”, or even as “rentier economies”? To what extent is each national 
economy open and export dependent? To what extent does the survival of the regime 
depend on outside resources, and how much direct control do they have over their 
distribution?  
 If the “rentier state” or the “rentier economy” character is empirically proven, is it 
related to the personality-centered exercise of power or perhaps to the degree of 
political suppression or regime stability? 
 If this link does exist, can it be understood as a causal relationship? In other words, 
does the rentier state result in stronger political oppression and/or more regime 
stability?  
 
One important finding in the paper is that two of the five states examined, namely 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, are very close to the ideal type of the “rentier state”. Although 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are politically less stable, they may be described as “rentier 
economies” greatly dependent on outside resources. It is also argued that Uzbekistan does not 
meet the criteria of a rentier state or a rentier economy, although Uzbek political elite groups 
are also guided by some form of the rentier logic. It is thus shown that in the case of these 
republics the authoritarian-neo-patrimonial nature of exercising power is not primarily due to 
their “rentier state” character. In the Central Asian context, the “rentier state” character 
appears to have a direct and fairly unambiguous impact on is political stability. Of the regimes 
based on the rentier logic, those that are rich in natural resources clearly perform better for 
political stability than those that have more modest economic resources.  
 
 
2. The rentier economy and rentier state as ideal-typical categories of 
analysis 
 
The rentier economy and rentier state as ideal-typical categories of analysis were first 
elaborated in the 1970s, based primarily on the examples of the oil producing and exporting 
Gulf States. In economy, rent is defined as earnings originating directly from selling natural 
resources rather than from production (Marshall cited by Beblawi 1990: 85).  
Consequently, a “rentier economy” is a national economy where the larger part of state 
revenues typically comes from exporting natural resources, for example oil. The rentier 
economy characteristically depends on some natural resource, although it could also rely on a 
different type of outside resource, for example, guest workers’ remittances. According to 
Luciani, the main distinguishing feature of a “rentier economy” is not primarily its exports of 
raw materials but rather the fact that national revenues originate from outside sources, rather 
than from domestic productive sectors (Luciani 1990: 71). A “rentier economy” does not 
necessarily lead to the emergence of a “rentier state”. In the case of a rentier state, outside 
earnings do not go directly to members of the society the way they do for example when guest 
workers make remittances, but a narrow elite, the government in fact, controls their 
distribution. During the 80s in the oil monarchies of the Middle East, for example, 2 or 3 per 
cent of the total population enjoyed full control over oil export revenues, making up as much 
as 80 or 90 per cent of the countries’ GDP (Beblawi 1990: 89). Luciani sees the main social 
function of rentier states in the social allocation of earnings; thus on the level of terminology 
he suggests a distinction between allocative and productive states (Luciani 1990: 71). In 
allocative states, the government does not levy taxes on citizens; on the contrary: every citizen 
is entitled to a certain income and other benefits. This is exactly why he does not classify 
rentier economies dependent on guest workers’ remittances as allocative states, since in this 
case the only, indirect, way the state can generate income from those sums is by imposing 
taxes on the families living at home (Luciani 1990: 72). The degree of the state’s allocativity 
or productivity is best reflected by the ratio of government social spending to the GDP, which 
in the oil exporting Arab countries of the Middle East was as high as 30 to 50 per cent in the 
1970s and 80s (Luciani 1990: 72-74). 
Using the examples of the non-oil producing states of the Middle East, namely Egypt, 
Tunisia and Morocco, Beblawi uses the term “semi-rentier”, which is a rough equivalent of 
Luciani’s “rentier economy”. These are countries where a considerable part of the GDP is 
made up of revenues coming from abroad, but not as payment for exports of natural resources. 
These earnings may originate from foreign military or financial aid, transit fees for using 
pipelines leasing the country’s infrastructure by allowing other states to use its airports or 
ports for establishing military bases, and last but not least, guest workers’ remittances.  
It appears that the rentier character of a state is related to its political system and extent of 
political stability. In those contexts where state revenues primarily come from taxing the 
society’s productive layers, a long-term regime cannot reign without some form of democratic 
legitimation, as illustrated by the well-known historical slogan “No taxation without 
representation” (Luciani 1990, 75). In allocative or rentier states as citizens are economically 
dependent on the state rather than the other way round, the political leadership does not 
“need” democratic legitimation. Based on the logic of “no representation without taxation” in 
several cases allocative regimes do not ensure even the semblance of democratic 
representation. For the functioning of the vertical patron-client logic of “rentier states”, a neo-
patrimonial authoritarian type of political structure provides a more suitable framework. 
Characteristically, the rentier state enhances the authoritarian features of the political system. 
This is how the state’s rentier character contributed to conserving the apparently rather 
anachronistic patrimonial monarchies of the Gulf States (Luciani 1990: 79-80). 
While there is a professional consensus about the negative effect of the “rentier state” on 
democratisation, over the past decades there has been a prolific debate about the relationship 
of the rentier character and regime stability. In the 2000s, primarily based on the studies of 
Collier and Hoeffler (2000) and de Soysa (2000), who examined the Middle East and 
countries of Sub Saharan Africa, it has become a generally accepted view that political 
instability and thus the danger of civil war has increased due to natural resources, especially 
the abundance of easy to exploit hydrocarbon fuels and minerals, and especially in poor 
developing countries.
1
 In contrast, research including findings about South Eastern Asia 
suggests that hydrocarbons and other minerals strengthen the political system’s stability, 
especially in authoritarian regimes (Colgan 2015), while in poor developing countries they 
may undermine the stability of democratic political systems (Smith 2015: 2). Michael L. Ross 
identifies a number of mechanisms through which rentier type authoritarian regimes may 
strengthen their power. In addition to the effects already examined in the literature (i.e. that 
through tax evasion the government is less accountable and large-scale social spending), Ross 
draws attention to the fact that rentier regimes rich in natural resources are able to effectively 
hamper the development of non-state dependent civil society (Ross 2001: 332-336). Gawrich 
and Franke are emphasizing that in a rentier state the middle classes, in particular, are 
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 According to game theoretical argumentation, geographically concentrated fixed locations of mineral deposits 
may be an attractive target for any armed rebel groups. They can capture them at relatively low investment costs, 
and for a long time afterwards, these resources will finance the maintenance of the conflict. Le Billon has found 
that concentrated mineral resource deposits located in a country’s central region contribute to the probability of a 
coup-type takeover, while those on the peripheries add to the probability of separatist type of armed conflicts. 
(Le Billon 2001: 573). 
 
 
missing. Instead of the middle class and traditional elites, there is an egoistic “rentier class” of 
civilian technocrats of public administration (Gawrich – Franke 2011a: 14.). 
As illustrated by remittances, in semi-rentier states the government’s role in the 
distribution of earnings coming from outside is not as exclusive as it is in rentier states. 
Therefore, semi-rentier regimes need at least the semblance of democratic legitimation much 
more and tend to be politically less stable than neo-patrimonial rentier regimes. Nevertheless, 
semi-rentier states also have wide clienteles dependent on the government, often appearing in 
the form of an artificially inflated, corrupt bureaucracy (Beblawi 1990: 97). 
 
3. Rentier states and rentier economies in post-Soviet Central Asia  
 
Wojciech Ostrowski argues that the analytical framework based on the notions of the “rentier” 
and “semi-rentier” state is easily applicable to the five post-Soviet successor states in Central 
Asia. He points out that the Central Asian rentier economy and rentier state character is 
fundamentally defined by two factors. On the one hand, as a heritage of the Soviet past, it can 
be attributed to the fact that within the Soviet Union the Central Asian republics were charged 
with the task of providing industrial centers in Slavic regions with raw materials, such as oil, 
cotton, etc.  On the other hand, their rentier character was further intensified by the price 
liberalization following the Soviet Union’s collapse, which resulted in drastic price rises and 
motivated the countries concerned to introduce some economic de-diversification (Ostrowski 
2011: 285-286).  
Unfortunately, however, Ostrowski does not clearly define what he means by a “rentier 
state” and a “rentier economy.” Consequently, although the main conclusions of his study are 
acceptable, his qualification of individual Central Asian Republics seems rather arbitrary. The 
literature offers a wide variety of methodological approaches to the conceptualisation of the 
“rentier state” and “rentier economy” as analytical categories. It is a generally used method to 
consider the proportion of oil and other minerals (or occasionally of agricultural raw 
materials) within the country’s full exports. The drawback of this method is that in itself it 
does not reflect the weight of the given mineral in the country’s economy, as for example its 
share in the GDP. Thus, the sectorial division of exports should be examined together with the 
degree of the country’s foreign trade openness.  Another frequently applied index is the ratio 
of oil and mineral export revenues to the GDP. Jeff D. Colgan, for example, regards as 
“petrostate” any state where per capita hydrocarbon production and export revenues exceed a 
hundred dollars a year (Colgan 2015: 4). Smith adds that per capita oil income gives us a 
realistic picture only if it is compared to the performance of the given national economy’s 
other sectors. Therefore, he recommends using a modified measure calculated as a ratio of per 
capita oil income and per capita GDP (Smith 2015: 6). Besides state revenues, when 
identifying the rentier character of a state it is also worth examining the extent of state 
expenditure, of which the percentage of government investments into the welfare or law 
enforcement institutions in the annual GDP may inform us.  
In line with the literature review, this paper will give an overview of the foreign trade 
structure of Central Asian republics, with special emphasis on the rate of hydrocarbon fuels 
and other minerals
2
 as well as of the degree of foreign trade openness of the countries 
concerned.  
On this basis, it is possible to calculate the weight of mineral exports and other external 
resources (e.g. guest workers’ remittances) in each country’s economy. Wherever revenues 
from hydrocarbons and minerals are close to, or even exceed 50 per cent of the annual GDP, 
we may safely assume that it is a rentier state. However, if the larger part of the GDP is 
composed of guest workers’ remittance, foreign aid or leasing fees, it is usually more 
adequate to use the labels “semi-rentier state” or “rentier economy”. Comparing all these data 
with the ratio of government spending to the GDP, we can conclude whether a republic 
should be seen as a rentier state, a rentier economy, or neither.  
After the economic collapse of the 1990s, measured in absolute figures, the first decade of 
the new millennium saw a considerable expansion of the Central Asian republics’ foreign 
trade. This however, did not necessarily mean that these national economies were becoming 
more open, as the rate of their own economic growth was close to, or occasionally even 
exceeded, the growth in exports and imports. Thanks to the increase in the price of energy and 
raw materials between 1999 and 2008, and a repeated increase after 2009, the volume of 
exports from the three net energy exporters, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 
showed a spectacular rise of 50 to 100 per cent compared to the value of their imports. The 
same trends, however, had a negative impact on the exports and foreign trade balance of the 
two net energy importers, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, primarily because of the rising fuel 
                                                 
2
 I do not regard exports of agricultural raw materials of special importance from this respect, as in the literature 
(De Soysa 2000; Le Billon 2001) there seems to be a consensus that the dominance of the agrarian sector, being 
labor rather than capital intensive, in the national economy does not lead to the emergence of the “rentier”  
character. In the sectoral analyses of Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan’s foreign trade, I used mostly COMTRADE 
statistics, while for the three other republics I had to rely on national statistical data, which are considered far 
more unreliable (they are closer to intelligent guesses than genuine statistics).  
prices, higher costs of transport and more expensive imported energy (Mogilevskii 2012: 7-
12). 
 
Table 1. Central Asian countries’ foreign trade openness 
Exports (million USD) - (%GDP) 
 
  2000 2000 2010 2010 2012 2012 
Kazakhstan 10353,71 57 65077,56 44 96882.56 48 
Kyrgyzstan 573,18 42 2471,7 52 3202.51 48 
Tajikistan 799,36 65 865,75 15 1644.16 22 
Turkmenistan 2774 96 17234,44 78 25760.63 73 
Uzbekistan 3383,4 25 12452,71 32 14251.92 28 
 
 
Source: World Bank  
 
In Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the oil sector has obtained an even more dominant position 
within the economy than before their independence. With the Kashagan oil fields discovered 
in the north west of the country, Kazakhstan owns the largest untapped oil resource outside 
the Middle East (Afanasyeva 2012) and is the 19
th
 most important oil producing country, 
while its stocks of natural gas are also remarkable. Within Kazakhstan’s exports the share of 
oil has increased from 25 per cent in the mid-1990s to nearly 50 per cent by the early 2000s. 
In addition, Kazakhstan is also one of the leading producers of copper, zinc and uranium 
(Olcott 2010: 169). 
With the 2006 discovery of the giant South Yolotan and Osman gas fields, 
Turkmenistan’s natural gas stocks are regarded as the sixth largest in the world, while 
following Russia, the USA and Iran, the country is the fourth most important natural gas 
exporter. Today the share of fuels in Turkmenistan’s exports is already over 80 per cent.  In 
the region, Turkmenistan has seen the largest, almost dramatic expansion in its foreign trade 
over the past decade. Between 2000 and 2010, the volume of exports tripled, while imports 
almost quadrupled. Because of these developments, the value of trade is more than 50 per cent 
of the GDP. Thanks to the dynamic growth of energy exports, in the period examined the 
country’s trade balance always showed a considerable surplus of over 20 per cent of the GDP 
(Mogilevskii 2012: 23). Thus, out of the five Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan is the one 
that seems closest to the oil monarchies of the Middle East representing the “classic” rentier 
states.  
The 2000s have brought Uzbekistan a dynamic growth in foreign trade: export output has 
nearly tripled, while imports have doubled. Thanks to the faster expansion of exports than 
imports, the country has accumulated a considerable foreign trade surplus amounting to about 
5 per cent of the GDP, which is still certainly more modest than that of Kazakhstan or 
Turkmenistan. As a result, by the end of the decade, the openness of the Uzbek economy rose 
to some 20 per cent from an estimated 12 per cent in 2002. In spite of this development, the 
Uzbek economy appears to be the least dependent on its foreign trade and the least open 
national economy in the region (Mogilevskii 2012: 26), which strongly modifies Ostrowski’s 
image of Uzbekistan as a “rentier state”.  
Uzbek exports are still dominated by raw materials. Combined, natural gas, non-ferrous 
metals and cotton make up 67.6 per cent of all exports, with no major fluctuation since 2000.  
Within raw materials, it is remarkable that the share of carbon fuels has almost doubled, rising 
from 12 per cent in 2000 to 25 per cent by 2010. The country that used to aim at being self-
sufficient for fossil fuels has developed into a major natural gas exporter on the regional level. 
Replacing cotton, by now natural gas has become Uzbekistan’s number one export item. In 
Uzbek agriculture and agrarian export, the share of fruit and vegetables has been increasing 
against cotton. The exports of various non-ferrous metals, primarily gold represent a stable 25 
per cent of all exports (Anderson – Klimov 2012: 18-20). 
  
Table 2. Share of hydrocarbon fuels and minerals in Central Asian states’ export and GDP. 
  Percentage of 
hydrocarbon fuels and 
minerals within the full 
exports  
Income from exports of 
hydrocarbon fuels and 
minerals (as a percentage of 
annual GDP) 
  2000 2010 2000 2010 
Kazakhstan 82% 91% 47,% 40% 
Kyrgyzstan 43% 60% 18% 31% 
Tajikistan 60% 80% 38% 12,% 
Turkmenistan 80% 83% 55% 64,% 
Uzbekistan 15% 37% 3% 11% 
Source: COMTRADE, Agency of Statistics of the RK, Agency on Statistics of the RT, National 
Statistical Committee of the KR, State Committee of the RU on Statistics, State Committee of 
Turkmenistan on Statistics, and the author’s calculations based on Mogilevskii’s (2012) data. The 
percentages are only estimates. 
 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were the two poorest republics in the Soviet Union, and even in the 
year when the Soviet Union collapsed, 35 per cent of the Kyrgyz Republic’s and nearly 46 per 
cent (almost half!) of the Tajik Republic’s budget came from subsidies from the Moscow 
centre (Collins 2006: 157). Unlike the other three republics, which in fact gained from the 
market liberalization of resource prices, economically Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were 
probably the countries hardest hit by the Soviet collapse. These states have accumulated 
considerable foreign trade deficits over the last two decades, which they have been able to 
finance from the remittances of the large numbers of their citizens working abroad as guest 
workers, as well as from incomes from informal cross border trade and re-exportation, 
international aids, and in the case of Tajikistan, supposedly also from the transit trade of 
illegal narcotics. (Mogilevskii 2012: 7-12). As Ostrowski points out, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan started to be like the countries of the “global south” - excluded from the “neoliberal 
project” and integrated into the global world economy mostly through a shadow economy 
based on money laundering, migration and drug dealing (Ostrowski 2011: 286). 
Industrially, Tajikistan was the least developed republic in Soviet times, and on top of 
that, the civil war ravaged most of the existing minimal industrial infrastructure. In our days, 
the main elements of Tajik industry are generating electric energy based on hydroelectric 
power stations and aluminium production, which requires significant amounts of electric 
energy. The significance of the Tursunzoda Aluminum Company on the Vakhsh River is 
indicated by the fact that half of Tajikistan’s (official) export earnings come from aluminium  
produced in this region and that this plant in itself uses some 40 per cent of the electric energy 
generated in the country (Olcott 2005: 115).  
In the absence of strong industry or well-working agriculture, even according to cautious 
estimates the rate of employment is over 40 per cent. In the decades following the civil war 
the Tajik population had three main sources of income: the lucky ones could work for an 
NGO active in the country, others lived on remittances, and still others joined the illegal drug 
trade, in fact the most stable pillar of the country’s economy (Olcott 2005: 113). Today some 
1.5 million Tajiks work abroad. Tajikistan has the highest proportion of migrants to the full 
population (every fifth citizen) in the former Soviet Union, as well as in the whole world 
(Erlich 2006). In 2005, their remittances totaled 600 million dollars, and it is estimated that 
even today remittances account for some 42 per cent of the GDP (World Bank 2012a). At 
least 15 per cent of Tajik households live exclusively on remittances (Nazriev and 
Manzarshoeva 2009).  
The second comparably significant source of income is the drug trade. Tajikistan shares a 
1,800 kilometre long, poorly protected border with the world’s number one heroin and opium 
grower, Afghanistan. It is estimated that as much as 90 tons of heroin, some 30 per cent of 
Afghanistan’s output, crosses the Tajik-Afghan border on its way to Russia. Earnings from 
the drug trade may amount to 30 to 50 per cent of the annual Tajik GDP. Thus, unlike in 
Mexico, after the civil war the drug trade made a special contribution to the stabilization of 
the Tajik central power and to stopping violence (The Economist 2012). 
Similarly to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan’s economic development was hindered by several 
factors already as a Soviet republic, primarily its isolated geographical position and the 
scarcity of its natural resources, including fossil fuels. It is perhaps due to this, that despite all 
its positive and negative effects, Soviet forced industrialization made less of an impact on 
Kyrgyzstan’s economy than on a number of other republics. Although here too the proportion 
of arable land is small, the weight of nomad animal husbandry continues to be considerable. 
Up to our days, agriculture employs nearly 40 per cent of the Kyrgyz population, providing at 
least one third of the republic’s GDP (World Bank 2012b: 6). 
Kyrgyzstan’s main source of fuel is traditionally Russia, while an increasing proportion of 
consumer goods is imported from China. In 2000-2010 exports increased by no more than 29 
per cent, while its imports increased 2.5-fold. As a result, the country where in the early 2000s 
exports and imports were balanced has accumulated a foreign trade deficit of more than 10 
per cent of the GDP, which it manages to finance through the remittances of growing numbers 
of Kyrgyz guest workers and expanding informal re-exportation. Because of the 
mushrooming imports, the Kyrgyz economy’s openness has also grown, reaching 40 or 50 per 
cent of the GDP.  
Since its independence, in Kyrgyzstan too only two sectors, namely the gold industry and 
hydroelectric power, have attracted sizeable international investment. The most important one 
off investment was a result of the agreement with the Cameco consortium about extracting the 
gold of the Kumtor site, which is located at more than 4,000 m above sea level and is hard to 
access. According to the concession, the Kyrgyz state is entitled to 70 per cent of the profits, 
amounting to 26 per cent of the full Kyrgyz budget and 40 per cent of the country’s exports 
(World Bank 2012b: 9).  
In Central Asia, it is probably Kyrgyzstan’s foreign trade that is impacted by re-
exportation the strongest. Informal cross border trade of cheap Chinese consumer goods, not 
even featuring in statistics, plays a major part in this. The main items of formal re-exportation 
are pieces of machinery and technical equipment, and fuel. One factor explaining the formerly 
considerable Kyrgyz fuel re-export had been the need to supply fuel to the Manas American 
transit center, which however was closed down in 2014. The second factor why Kyrgyzstan, 
poor in fossil and hydrocarbon fuels, has become the main regional distribution center of 
these goods is that due to the close Russian-Kyrgyz relations, it obtains Russian petrol, diesel 
oil and kerosene at lower prices than its neighbors, especially Uzbekistan. Kyrgyz fossil 
energy exportation is probably the re-exportation of Russian imports, since not only the stocks 
of crude oil and natural gas but also the country’s refining capacities are very limited 
(Mogilevskii 2012: 20). 
Besides the expanding formal and informal re-exportation, international aid and guest 
workers’ remittances have been the main sources of the Kyrgyz rentier economy.  In 2007, 
guest workers’ remittances amounted to 27 per cent of the Kyrgyz GDP, the fourth highest 
percentage in the world (Marat 2009: 8). From 2000, the American military base at the Manas 
airport near Bishkek, established as part of the action again Afghanistan, was a significant 
source of foreign currency for the Kyrgyz government.  
 
Table 3. Annual per capita fuel/mineral export income in Central Asian states 
 
Per capita fuel/mineral export income in Central Asian states  
(USD) 
 
2000 2010 
Kazakhstan 571 3627 
Kyrgyzstan 49 269 
Tajikistan 76 91 
Turkmenistan 353 2804 
Uzbekistan 14  154  
Source: COMTRADE, Agency of Statistics of the RK,  Agency on Statistics of the RT, National Statistical 
Committee of the KR, State Committee of the RU on Statistics, State Committee of Turkmenistan on 
Statistics, and the author’s calculations based on Mogilevskii’s 2012 data.  
 
In the light of these data, it seems that Turkmenistan is the only republic that fully meets 
the definition of a “rentier state.”  For Kazakhstan the picture is somewhat more nuanced, but 
it is also close to the ideal type of the “rentier state.” (It is hardly accidental that it is in these 
two countries that we find by far the highest per capita hydrocarbon/mineral export revenues.) 
At the same time, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, poor in raw materials but largely dependent on 
outside resources, fit the analytical category of the “semi-rentier” state (Ostrowski 2011: 286). 
Unlike Ostrowski, however, I argue that as reflected by foreign trade statistics, Uzbekistan 
does not meet the criteria of the rentier state, not even those of the rentier economy; on the 
contrary, it seems to be a clearly closed national economy aimed at autarky,
3
 although Uzbek 
elite groups are visibly guided by a kind of rent-hunting logic.  
 
4. Personality-centred politics and the authoritarian exercise of power 
 
In the literature dealing with Central Asia, qualifying the authoritarian political systems of 
post-Soviet Central Asian republics as “neo-patrimonial4” is widely accepted  (Collins 2006; 
Cummings 2002; Ishimaya 2002). In them, political power is carried by individuals and 
interpersonal patronage networks, rather than bureaucratic institutions. Henceforth, for the 
sake of simplicity these are labelled as “clans”. Typically, neopatrimonial regimes do not have 
a solid political ideology either. The basic dynamics of political processes are defined by the 
logic of the patron-client relationship: public offices may be won in return for personal 
services, as if they were rewards in exchange for which the clients are supposed to mobilize 
the required number of voters for their patron at the time of elections. As Ishimaya highlights 
the emergence of neopatrimonial regimes in periods of political transition when there is no 
solid institutional background is almost typical in case of liberated former colonies. The 
development of a rentier economy may be a factor enhancing the neopatrimonial character of 
political regimes, since patronage networks related to the political leader(s) constitute the 
primary mediating channel between outside earnings and the domestic economy (Ishimaya 
2002: 43-45).   
In respect of their constitutional setup, measured by the Krouwel scale,
5
 four of the five 
republics clearly fall into the category of presidential rather than parliamentary governments. 
Following the 2010 Revolution and constitutional reform, Kyrgyzstan changed to the 
parliamentary form of government, but the president’s powers are still considerably stronger 
                                                 
3
 This is the case even if in addition to export revenues of hydrocarbon fuels and other minerals, in Uzbekistan 
the revenues from the cotton sector and cotton exportation are also seen as rentier sources, as the work is 
typically done in agricultural cooperatives using day labourers and free student labour, which is close to 
employing slave labour (Acemoglu – Robinson 2012: 391-395). Even if our calculations use data modified by 
the incomes of the cotton exports, no more than 10-15 per cent of the Uzbek GDP originates from exporting raw 
materials.  
4”Neo” as a prefix indicates that unlike with traditional patrimonial systems, in neopatrimonial regimes 
traditional legitimating forms and dynastic heritage do not necessarily contribute to constituting political power 
(Ishimaya 2002). 
5
 According to the Krouwel method, countries examined are awarded plus and minus points based on the 
presidential or parliamentary features of their constitutional structure. Thus on the Krouwel scale, -10 means the 
“idealtypical parliamentary” structure, while +10 indicates the “idealtypical presidential structure.” If a country 
scores in the negative zone, it is closer to the parliamentary, while if it scores in the positive zone, it is closer to 
the presidential model (Krouwel 2003). In our days, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan score +8, +6 and 
+6 respectively, while since the 2011 constitutional changes Uzbekistan scores only +4, and since the 2010 
parliamentary reforms Kyrgyzstan scores +1 (Borisov 2011: 63). 
than usual for heads of state in parliamentary systems. The presidents’ political influence goes 
beyond their constitutional powers. Thus in agreement with Borisov, it is argued that in the 
Central Asian context presidential government is the expression of a personality-centred 
exercise of power rather than its cause (Borisov 2011). For the type of their political structure, 
the regimes concerned may be described primarily as neo-patrimonial, personality-centred 
presidential dictatorships rather than party states or military dictatorships.  
All five countries have constantly low democracy indices. In fact, over the past 25 years, 
they have not met even the minimalist democracy criteria. In light of international reports by 
organisations such as OSCE, Central Asian parliamentary and presidential elections have not 
been free and fair, and in many cases not even competitive. The only possible exceptions are 
the 2010 and 2011 Kyrgyz parliamentary and presidential elections, which observers have 
qualified as free and fair
 
 (OSCE 2010 a, b) and about which the head of the OSCE election 
observers said that it [i.e. the 2010 parliamentary election] had been the first in the Central 
Asian region where the outcome was not fully predictable (Huskey – Hill 2013: 238). The 
most widely known indicators of the concept of minimalist democracy are the country reports 
in Freedom in the World, the annual Freedom House publication.
6
  
 
Table 4. Political and civil rights in the Central Asian republics 
 
Source: Freedom House(2014) 
 
                                                 
6
 The 195 countries examined today are graded for political and civil rights. Freedom House’s “political rights” 
may be regarded as the empirical expression of the most minimalist democracy concept. This aggregates 
indicators of three areas: 1. the election process, 2. political pluralism and participation and 3. the functioning of 
government. “Civil rights” embrace four categories: 1. freedom of expression; 2. freedom of assembly and 
political organisation; 3.rule of law and 4. personal autonomy and rights. Taking the average of the two 
indicators if the score is 1 to 2.5, the state is free; if it is 3 to 5, it is partially free; and if the score is 5 to 7, the 
state is not free. 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
  
Polical 
rights 
Civil 
liberties 
Polical 
rights 
Civil 
liberties 
Polical 
rights 
Civil 
liberties 
Polical 
rights 
Civil 
liberties 
Polical 
rights 
Civil 
liberties 
Kazakhstan 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 
Kyrgyzstan 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 
Tajikistan 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 6 6 6 
Turkmenistan 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Uzbekistan 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) analysts have been working with the The 
Economist since 2006, conducting similar monitoring as the Freedom House country reports. 
The EIU acknowledges that it intends to measure and operationalize a wider concept of 
democracy than does Freedom House. Their “democracy index” is an aggregate of over 60 
indicators based on the World Values Survey, Eurobarometer and Gallup polls. According to 
these, countries are placed into four categories: 1. full democracies (8-10 points); 2. flawed 
democracies (6-7.9 points); 3. hybrid regimes (4-5.9 points); 4. authoritarian regimes (scores 
below 4). The fundamental difference between full and flawed democracies is in the quality of 
government and political culture, while in hybrid and authoritarian regimes the freedom and 
fairness of elections and human liberties are also affected. Based on this democracy index, 
four Central Asian republics are regarded as authoritarian, while Kyrgyzstan is a hybrid 
regime. These qualifications are generally in line with the Freedom House evaluations. 
 
Table 5. The evaluation of Central Asian countries based on the EIU Democracy Index 
  2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Kazakhstan 3.17 3.04 2.95 3.24 3.03 3.45 3.62 
Kyrgyzstan 5.24 4.69 4.69 4.34 4.31 4.05 4.08 
Tajikistan 2.37 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.45 2.45 
Turkmenistan 1.83 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.83 
Uzbekistan 2.45 1.72 1.72 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.85 
 
Source: EIU (2014). 
 
5. Regime stability and its indicators 
 
Issues of political stability and instability seem to have even more varied indicators in the 
literature than political democracy. Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel define political 
instability as constitutional or unconstitutional change(s) in the exercise of executive power 
(Alesina et al. 1996). Roberto Perotti and Robert J. Barro focus primarily on political 
violence when defining the degree of regime stability, and suggest that the number of 
revolutions, coups, political attempts and terrorist attacks should be considered (Barro 1991; 
Perotti 1996). In contrast, Air Aisen and Francisco Vega understand political instability as the 
frequency of government crises and cabinet changes (Aisen and Vega 2011: 3). Regarding 
these factors, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan seem much more instable than the other three. We 
should not forget that in the 1990s there was a ravaging regionally-based civil war in the 
former, and violent rioting broke the ruling regime in 2005 and 2010. Although Uzbekistan 
did not have a similarly violent regime change, on the regional level in 2005 too there were 
uprisings in the Ferghana Valley. 
The concepts described focus on effective (violent or constitutional) changes in the 
political system or regime, or more precisely, on the frequency of these events. This however 
does not necessarily inform us about a political system’s potential fragility. The Fragile States 
Index (earlier Failed States Index) of the American Fund for Peace think tank, aggregating 12 
indicators intends to grasp this fragility. Six of the 12 indicators are more of a socio-economic 
character, while the other six try to quantify political and security risks.
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Table 6. The 2014 evaluation of Central Asian republics based on the 12 indicators of the FFP 
FSI Index 
  
Demographic 
Pressures 
Refugees 
and IDP's 
Group 
Grievance 
Human -
flight & 
Brain Drain 
Uneven 
Economic 
Develpoment 
Poverty and 
Economic 
Decline 
Kazakhstan 5.1 3.8 6.5 3.9 5 5.9 
Kyrgyzstan 6 5.5 8.2 6.1 6.7 7.3 
Tajikistan 7.5 5.1 7 6.1 5.9 7.7 
Turkmenistan 6 4.2 6.9 5.1 6.7 5.3 
Uzbekistan 6.4 5.7 7.4 6.6 7.3 7.1 
              
              
  
State 
Legitimacy 
Public 
Services 
Human 
Rights and 
Rule of 
Law 
Security 
Apparatus 
Factionalized 
Elites 
External 
Interventio
n 
Kazakhstan 7.7 4.8 7.2 6 7.6 5 
Kyrgyzstan 8.2 5.9 7.3 7.1 8 7.6 
Tajikistan 9 6.2 7.9 7.1 8.4 6.7 
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 It needs to be noted here that the professional reception of the FSI is not unanimous. As pointed out by critics, 
for example Tamás Csiki, it makes one think that in the light of the FSI scores, two thirds of the world’s 
countries are highly fragile and drifting towards state failure  (Csiki 2009: 93), with such politically clearly 
repressive but at the same time extremely strong powers as Russia and China among them. This begs the 
question whether the criteria have not been too strict (Marsai 2014). Others argue that it is absurd that because of 
the focus of indicators that intend to highlight potential instability, countries where an effective civil war is 
raging (e.g. Syria) get better evaluation than definitely poor and vulnerable, but peaceful countries, such as 
Kenya (Ross 2013).In response to these critiques, the developers of the FSI have said that although the index 
puts state function into its focus, the categories they use for assessment belong to the field of human security. 
This index is supposed to reflect the state’s stability, as well as its citizens’ human security. This is why 
countries with a strong status apparatus, such as China, may fall into a relatively weaker category, because 
centralised public governance is often coupled with repressive, authoritarian trends that increase the individual’s 
vulnerability and question the rule of law (Marsai 2014). 
 
Turkmenistan 9.6 6.4 8.5 6.8 7.8 4.9 
Uzbekistan 9.3 5.4 9.3 7.6 8.8 5.4 
 
 Source: Fund for Peace 
 
In the present study, special attention is given to the World Bank’s World Governance Index 
(WGI) measuring political stability by using primarily opinion polls (e.g. World Economic 
Forum Global Competitiveness Survey) and analyses of international risk analysis companies 
and organisations (e.g.  PRS International Country Risk Guide; Cingranelli – Richards 
Human Rights Database and International Terror Scale, etc.). Critics of the WGI 
methodology argue that these calculations express citizens’ and analysts’ expectations rather 
than the objective degree of political violence and instability (Arndt and Oman 2008; Thomas 
2009; Langbein and Knack 2010). According to the WGI data, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan 
seem politically most stable, while the other three are less so, which is hardly surprising if we 
consider the 2005 and 2010 Kyrgyz revolutions and the 2005 Andijan unrest. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Central Asian republics WGI political stability index 1996-2013 
 Source: World Bank 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
When comparing the indicators for regime stability and political democracy Central Asian 
republics constitute a rather homogeneous block and show very weak results both for the 
democratic exercise of power and political stability. In this respect, Kyrgyzstan may be an 
exception whose political stability indicators are much worse than those for democracy. To 
some extent, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are also exceptions, as the character of exercising 
power is similar to what we see in the other Central Asian republics, but politically they seem 
somewhat more stable.   
As far as the character of exercising power, or the dimensions of democracy and 
autocracy, Central Asian republics’ positions are not very varied: four of the five are clearly 
in the autocratic spectrum. Although in the early 1990s the expectations were not unfounded 
that the Central Asian republics would eventually split into a politically more liberal 
(Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) and an authoritarian block (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and 
Tajikistan). This idea may have seemed attractive also because it echoed a civilizational fault 
line between the former steppe zone and Transoxania. In the same way as the Soviet 
modernization swept away the old civilizational fault line between the Steppe Region and 
Transoxania, we can no longer talk of the liberal-authoritarian fault line, if it ever existed at 
all. The Kazakh autocracy is less and less “liberal” and has greatly assimilated to the 
“standard Central Asian model”. As evaluated by Freedom House, neither did the 2010 
Kyrgyz parliamentary turn– at least in such a short run  – lead to a significant shift towards 
democratization. The EIU democracy index shows more divergence for Kyrgyzstan: 
especially in its electoral process and participation, the country has had much higher scores in 
recent years than the other Central Asian republics. At the same time, the quality of political 
culture and the efficiency of government have not shown similar improvement. Neither did 
switching to parliamentary government and a competitive multi-party system make the 
Kyrgyz system more stable overnight. Based on the indicators described, it is still among the 
potentially more instable political systems. In the dimension of regime stability vs. lability, 
the FSI index shows very little divergence between the five countries: they all fall into the 
endangered category and should be given a “warning”. The WGI index, however, shows more 
marked differences: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan seem to be politically more stable 
autocracies, while Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are – at least potentially – more 
instable political systems.  
The puzzle raised as the starting point of this paper was how the possible differences in 
exercising power and regime stability appear to be related to the rentier nature of the state, or 
its absence. It appears that those regimes prove to be more stable that are closest to the 
conceptual ideal type of the rentier state”, namely the hydrocarbon exporting Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan. Although as we have seen, the political elites of the other three regimes are 
also characterised by the rent-seeking logic, their countries are not rentier states, but rentier 
economies at best (although in the case of the strongly self-dependent Uzbekistan, even this 
label is questionable). 
Unlike Wojciech Ostrowski, I would argue that in the case of central Asian republics, the 
autocratic exercise of power is not necessarily due to their rentier nature. There are more 
repressive and more liberal rentier states, and among the non-rentier regimes, Uzbekistan is as 
autocratic as Turkmenistan. It seems however, that in the Central Asian context there is a 
relationship between a state’s rentier nature and political stability. Of the regimes guided by 
the rentier logic, those that are rich in natural resources, as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are 
clearly doing better as far as their political stability is concerned than those that possess 
meagre resources, namely Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  
As far as the correlation of the rentier character and regime stability is concerned, their 
deeper interrelations are varied. One obvious casual mechanism identified is what we call  
alimentative social policy, which can be observed in Arab and Latin-American rentier states 
as well. This distinctive welfare mix consists hangovers from the paternalistic Soviet welfare 
system like the free use of public transport, the subsidization of staple foods and populist ad 
hoc benefit payments mostly at the context of elections (Gawrich – Franke 2011b: 88). The 
Turkmen regime has spent state earnings generated by the state controlled gas sector mainly 
on wide-ranging price subsidies for the public and social benefits. Since 1993, the Turkmen 
state has provided free drinking water, gas and electric energy to its citizens. In addition, the 
agricultural sector based on monocultural cotton production and employing some 50 per cent 
of the work force is still mainly subsidised from natural gas revenues
8
 (Pomfret 2006: 90-97). 
In Kazakhstan we observe a similar strategic and paternalistic use of social policy. 
According to the presidential address to the Kazakhstani people in February 2008, budgetary 
allocations for education, health care and social security have grown more than fivefold since 
2000 (Gawrich – Franke 2011b: 91). 
 
Table 7. Government spending as a percentage of GDP by country 
  2000 2010 
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 Despite heavy subsidies to the agrarian sector, the country has to import nearly 70 per cent of basic foodstuffs. 
Because of forced irrigation, Turkmenistan’s limited arable land is strongly affected by salinization. Thus, food 
shortages were not infrequent in the 1990s (Ochs 1997, 343). 
Kazakhstan 13.72% 23.70% 
Kyrgyzstan 15.80% 21.14% 
Tajikistan no data 26.10% 
Turkmenistan no data 9.30% 
Uzbekistan no data 32.20% 
 
Source: CEIC Global Database and the author’s calculations based on World Bank WDI 
indicators and CIA Factbook data 
 
However, as seen in table 5, in the Central Asian republics government spending, with 
welfare and military expenses included, are not extremely high as compared to the GDP, 
because in the oil countries of the Middle East and western European welfare states, they are 
considerably higher. What is more, based on statistical data, it is the rentier type regimes in 
Central Asia that have relatively the lowest government spending. (Naturally, this does not 
mean to say that in absolute figures the welfare expenses of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
even Uzbekistan do not considerably exceed those of Tajikistan.) I would argue that the 
regime stabilising mechanism of the Kazakh or Turkmen rentier states does not primarily 
work through their welfare or military spending as indicated also in the government’s official 
statistics. The revenues of exporting oil, natural gas and other minerals are utilised much more 
through the channels of clan-based patronage networks.  
After gaining independence, the political trajectory of Central Asian republics was 
defined by the dynamics of the regionally affiliated clans’ competition. The stability of 
Central Asian regimes was guaranteed by informal pacts ensuring some kind of balance 
between the politically and economically stronger “clans” or political fractions (Collins 2006: 
51-53).  The cornerstone of these inter-clan pacts is a balanced division of state patronage 
positions and incomes.  A decrease or sudden drying up of external sources of revenues may 
aggravate the fight for power between clans, and may even lead to a dramatic loss of balance 
in inter-clan pacts. This is demonstrated by the examples of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan where 
informal political fractions saw the state almost exclusively as the source of patronage 
incomes. As in Tajikistan right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in Kyrgyzistan a 
little later, starting from the late 1990s these started drying up, the fight between clans became 
fiercer for control over the dwindling political and economic resources. In Tajikistan this led 
to the breakout of an open civil war, while in Kyrgyzstan to two violent regime changes. In 
case of Uzbekistan, a country relatively rich in natural resources, this instability for the 
moment means potential fragility only. In Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, it seems that the 
regime consolidation based on a division of rentier incomes can be maintained in the long run. 
The causal relations of a state’s rentier character and clan-based regime stability offer a 
promising direction for future research in the framework of post-Soviet Central Asian 
political systems.  
 
References 
 
Acemoglu, D. – Robinson, J. A. (2012): Why nations fail? The origins of power, prosperity 
and poverty. New York: Crown Business. 
Afanasyeva, A. (2012): Kashagan's big oil coming to market in mid-2013. Reuters 
2012.08.10. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/10/kazakhstan-oil-kashagan-
idUSL6E8J7CML20120810, accessed: 15.03.2015. 
Aisen, A. – Vega, F. J. (2011): How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth? IMF 
Working Paper 1112. 
Alesina, A. – Ozler, S. – Roubini, N. – Swagel, P. (1996): Political instability and economic 
growth. Journal of Economic Growth 1(2): 189-211.  
Anderson, B. – Klimov, J. (2012): Uzbekistan: Trade Regime and Recent Trade 
Developments, Central Asian University. http://www.ucentralasia.org/downloads/UCA-
IPPA-WP4-Uzbekistan%20and%20Regional%20Trade.pdf, accessed: 26.11.2014. 
Arndt, C. – Oman C. (2008): The Politics of Governance Ratings. Maastricht University 
Working Paper. http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/show/id=4416424/langid=42, 
accessed: 05.03.2015. 
Radio Free Europe (2014): Atambaev Says No Foreign Troops At Manas After 2014. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyzstan_president_says_no_foreign_troops_manas_201
4/24490080.html, accessed: 24.02.2014. 
Barro, R. J. (1991): Economic growth in a cross section of countries. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 106(2): 407-443.  
Beblawi, H. (1990): The Rentier State in the Arab World. In: Luciani, G. (ed.): The Arab 
State. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press  
Borisov, N. (2011): The institution of presidency in the Central Asian countries: 
personalization vs. institutionalization. Central Asia and the Caucasus 12(4): 57-66. 
Colgan, J. D. (2015): Oil, domestic conflict and opportunities for democratization. Journal of 
Peace Research 52(1) 3-16. 
Collier, P. – Hoeffler A. (2000): Greed and Grievance in Civil War. The World Bank 
Development Research Group 
Collins, K. (2006): Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Cummings, S. (2002): Power and change in Central Asia. In: Cummings, S. (ed.): Power and 
change in Central Asia. London and New York: Routledge 
Csiki, T. (2009): A Failed States Index 2009. Nemzet és Biztonság – Biztonságpolitikai 
Szemle 7(2): 87-93. 
de Soysa, I. (2000): The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity? In: 
Berdal, M. – Malone, D. M. (eds): Greed and Grievance. Economic Agenda in civil 
Wars. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.  
The Economist (2012): Drugs in Tajikistan. Heroin stabilises a poor country. 
http://www.economist.com/node/21553092, accessed: 23.02.2014. 
Erlich, A (2006): Tajikistan: From Refugee Sender to Labor Exporter. Migration Policy 
Institute.  http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=411, accessed: 23.02. 
2014. 
Frye, T. (1997): A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies. 
Comparative Political Studies 30(5): 523-552.  
Gawrich, A. – Franke, A. (2011a): Introduction. In: Gawrich, A. – Franke, A. – Windwehr, J. 
(eds): Are Resources a Curse? Rentierism and Energy Policy in Post-Soviet States. 
Opladen, Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers. 
Gawrich, A. – Franke, A. (2011b): Autocratic Stability and Post-Soviet Rentierism: the Cases 
of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In: Gawrich, A. – Franke, A. – Windwehr, J. (eds.):  Are 
Resources a Curse? Rentierism and Energy Policy in Post-Soviet States. Opladen, 
Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers. 
Ishimaya, J. (2002): Neopatrimonialism and the prospects for democratization in the Central 
Asian republics. In: Cummings, S. (ed.): Power and change in Central Asia. London 
and New York: Routledge 
Krouwel, A. (2003): Measuring presidentialism of Central and East European countries. VU 
Amsterdam Political Science Working Papers. 
http://www.fsw.vu.nl/en/Images/Measuring%20presidentialism%20of%20Central%20a
nd%20East%20European%20countries_tcm31-42727.pdf, accessed: 10.02.2014. 
Langbein, L. – Knack, S. (2010): The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Six, One, or None? 
The Journal of Development Studies 46(2): 350-370.  
Le Billon, P. (2001): The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts. 
Political Geography 20: 561-584. 
Luciani, G. (1990): Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework. In: Luciani, 
G. (ed.): The Arab State. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Marsai, V. (2014): A 2014-es jubileumi Fragile (Failed) States Index és tanulságai [The 2014 
Failed States Index and its main findings]. NKE Sratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont 
Elemzések – 2014/16.  
Mogilevskii, R. (2012): Trends and Patterns in Foreign Trade of Central Asian Countries. 
University of Central Asia, Institute of Public policy and Administration Working 
Paper. 
Nazriev, S. – Manzarshoeva, A. (2009): Poverty Tajikistan's only growth area. Asia Times 
Online. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/KH06Ag01.html, accessed: 
2014.02.23. 
Ochs, M. (1997): Turkmenistan: the quest for stability and control. In Dawisha, K. – Parrott, 
B. (eds.): Conflict, cleavage and change in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Olcott, M. B. (2005): Central Asia’s Second Chance. Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. 
Olcott, M. B. (2010): Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise? Carnegie Endowment For 
International Peace. 
OSCE (2010): Активные и плюралистические парламентские выборы создают основу 
для дальнейшего укрепления демократии [Active and pluralistic parliamentary 
elections provide a basis for further strengthening of democracy]. 
http://www.osce.org/ru/odihr/72026, accessed: 04.11. 2014.] 
OSCE (2011): Kyrgyzstan’s presidential election was peaceful, but shortcomings underscore 
need to improve integrity of process. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/84571, 
accessed: 01.02. 2014. 
Ostrowski, W. (2011): Rentierism, Dependency and Sovereignty in Central Asia. In: 
Cummings, S. and Hinnebush, R. (eds.): Sovereignty after empire: comparing the 
Middle East and Central Asia. Edinburgh: Edinburg University Press. 
Perotti, R. (1996): Growth, income distribution and democracy: What the data say. Journal of 
Economic Growth 1(2): 149-187.  
Pomfret, R. (2006): The Central Asian Economies since Independence. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press  
Roeder, P. G. (1994): Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian Regimes. Post-Soviet Affairs 
10(1): 61-101. 
Ross, E. (2013): Failed states are a western myth. The Guardian, 28 June.  
Ross, M. L. (1999): The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. World Politics 51: 297-
322.  
Ross, M. L. (2001): Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics 53: 325-361.  
Smith, B. (2015): Resource wealth as rent leverage: Rethinking the oil-stability nexus. 
Conflict Management and Peace Science, published online before print, November 3, 
doi: 10.1177/0738894215609000 1-21. 
Spechler, D. R. – Spechler, M. C. (2009): Uzbekistan among the great powers. Communist 
and Post-communist Studies 42(3): 353-373.  
Thomas, M. (2009): What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure? European 
Journal of Development Research 22(1): 31–54.  
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014): Turkmenistan 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=TX, accessed: 22.02.2014. 
World Bank (2012a): Country Brief Tajikistan. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/TAJIKISTA
NEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20630697~menuPK:287255~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~t
heSitePK:258744,00.html, accessed: 23.02.2014. 
World Bank (2012b): Kyrgyz Republic Partnership Program Snapshot. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKYRGYZ/Resources/KR_Snapshot_March2012
_final.pdf, accessed: 23.02.2014. 
